Privatised provision of essential plant breeding infrastructure

As private plant breeding replaces public programs, the efficient provision and utilisation of key enabling technologies for crop breeding, which are largely knowledge based and provide the foundation for variety improvement, might be at risk. Typically, such inputs are non‐rival in use and are therefore termed essential plant breeding infrastructure (EPBI). Specific threats include the possibility of wasteful duplication in production, under‐production, under‐utilisation of produced EPBI because of price rationing, and anticompetitive outcomes in plant breeding and downstream markets. The likely level of under‐investment in hypothetical molecular‐marker technology by a profit‐maximising monopoly producer, charging uniform prices for access, is analysed using results from the published literature on excludable public goods.Crop Production/Industries,

Access Issues for Plant Breeders in an Increasingly Privatized World

There is a growing trend to widespread privatisation of crop breeding, and there are grounds for expecting this trend to continue and even to accelerate. Possible consequences for Australian grain growers and the national interest of much greater private sector involvement in plant breeding are explored. Growing privatisation and commercialisation of plant breeding will lead to increased competition between plant breeders. While this increased competition has been at least partly driven by the potential for value creation, it also is likely to enhance value creation from plant breeding so long as there is adequate continuing investment in the capacity for plant breeding, and more particularly in productivity enhancing enabling technology. In the event of monopoly provision of such enabling technology, an important policy issue will be access to what might be termed essential plant breeding infrastructure. For any access regime to essential infrastructure, the core issue is to select terms and conditions for access that promote full and efficient competition in upstream and downstream markets (e.g. plant breeding) while preserving the incentive for adequate levels of investment in the ongoing development, maintenance, and provision of such essential infrastructure. A key, perhaps pivotal issue will be pricing policy and practice. Because EPBI has the public good characteristic of being non-rival in use, price discovery by market processes can not be expected to produce the desired outcome. Moreover, even if an access regime mandated that EPBI be made available to all plant breeders at a uniform price, the imbalance in market power between the monopoly provider of EPBI and plant breeders seeking access would almost inevitably result in both under-production of EPBI, and in under-utilisation of any produced EPBI due to price rationing. Such outcomes would severely undermine the competitive position of Australian grain growers in international markets. Results from the literature on what are called excludable public goods are used to analyse the impact on the incentive for adequate investment in EPBI under an access regime mandating uniform pricing.Privatisation, plant breeding, access, enabling technologies, competition policy, excludable public goods., Crop Production/Industries, Production Economics,

Catch allocation in a shared fishery with a minimally managed recreational sector

A prevalent problem in shared fisheries is competition between commercial and recreational fishers for access to a resource that is subject to increasing utilisation pressure. For most shared fisheries in New Zealand, the commercial sector is efficiently managed with a regime of individual transferable quota (ITQ), but the recreational fishing is only minimally managed. A model is developed that can be used to explore the size of the total allowable catch (TAC) that is both sustainable AND maximises the value to the NZ economy of the combined commercial and recreational catch when the commercial catch is regulated via a total allowable commercial catch (TACC) while the recreational catch (RC) is self regulating. Determinants of the optimal catch allocation include: • the relative size of annual value to recreational fishers vis-à-vis the value of one unit of ACE to the commercial fishing sector from a unit decrease in the TACC • the relation between value to recreational fishers and size of stock biomass • the biology, and in particular the population dynamics of the fishery • the nature of the functional relationship between the self regulating recreational catch and stock biomass. The model can be applied to a fishery of interest by quantifying the above variables and relationships.economics management shared fishery catch allocation, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

Review of the Returns to ACIAR's Bilateral R&D Investments

Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies,

A Note on Optimal Effort in the Maldivian Tuna Fishery

This note argues that spatial considerations and travel costs should be taken into account in devising tax/subsidy regulations for island-based tuna fisheries. In particular, the effect of a landings tax on distant fishing grounds should be considered when setting the level of the tax. A fuel subsidy is suggested as a means of offsetting the impact of the landings tax on marginal grounds.Environmental Economics and Policy, Research Methods/ Statistical Methods, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

Out of the pot and into the money: Managing the Western Rock Lobster Fishery by ITE's or ITQ's?

The West Coast Rock Lobster fishery is Australia's most valuable commercial fishery. Around 550 vessels harvest an average of 10,500 tonnes of lobster per annum. The industry has an enviable track record of biological management based on a variety of input controls, although three significant pot reduction interventions have been necessary in recent years. An evaluation of a range of possible future management regimes is reported in this paper. The results were derived from a purpose built bio-economic model three separate biological zones in the fishery using non linear optimization to produce ten year steady state solutions for alternative management options. Management options included the current pot control system, and versions of variable transferable catch quota. Key outputs for each scenario include: net economic benefits, breeder biomass index, annual catch, annual pot lifts, number of pots and vessel numbers. The results indicate significant potential net economic gains from moving away from the current input control regime. The range of scenarios modelled illustrated some of the tradeoffs between maximising net economic returns and minimizing biological risks, as well as quantifying the impact of changes such as improved pot design and extended fishing seasons. The results will inform consideration by the industry about a possible new management system.rock lobster, quotas, ITQs, Western Australia, bioeconomic, economic benefits, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

Rent Generation During the Transition to a Managed Fishery: The Case of the New Zealand ITQ System

This paper examines the generation of resource rent during the transition from an over-exploited to an efficiently managed fishery. A simple theoretical model is used to demonstrate that current industry returns may below or even negative during this adjustment phase. A case in point is the New Zealand commercial fisheries which have recently become subject to a Quota Management System. Three sources of evidence on the level of resource rents generated during the initial years of the Quota Management System are examined and compared. These sources are: annual profitability data; the market price of perpetual quota; and the market price of annual lease quota. The evidence in some cases appears to be contradictory and an attempt is made to resolve or explain such differences. It is concluded that a better understanding of price determination in the quota market is required in order to draw correct inferences about rent generation.Rent, Generation, Transition, Individual, Transferable, Quotas, Fishery, Management, New Zealand, Environmental Economics and Policy, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

The Benefits and Beneficiaries of "Public" Investment in Herbicide Use Research and Development

The allocation of benefits from research and development of new herbicide uses is dependent on patent status. The agricultural chemical industry will preferentially invest in herbicide R&D that increases the use of on-patent herbicides from which a company can capture a price premium. The distribution of benefits from increased use of on-patent herbicide will alter over time, with grain growers benefiting at the expense of agrichemical companies once the patent expires. Public sector investment in herbicide R&D may also benefit the agrichemical industry. The size and allocation of the benefits from R&D into on-patent herbicides is analyzed using economic surplus techniques. Two case studies are examined. One involves research into the choice and application of herbicide for new wheat varieties. The second case study involves returns from R&D investment in research into an alternative for the commonly used off-patent herbicide trifluralin. The results from the case studies show that herbicide patent status may not have important implications for "public" R&D investment decisions.Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies, Q16, Q18, Q28,

Impacts of Mud Crab Hatchery Technology in Vietnam

Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

Special issue on water economics and policy

Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,